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Abstract—Software deobfuscation is a crucial activity in secu-
rity analysis and especially, in malware analysis. While standard
static and dynamic approaches suffer from well-known short-
comings, Dynamic Symbolic Execution (DSE) has recently been
proposed has an interesting alternative, more robust than static
analysis and more complete than dynamic analysis. Yet, DSE
addresses certain kinds of questions encountered by a reverser
namely feasibility questions. Many issues arising during reverse,
e.g. detecting protection schemes such as opaque predicates
fall into the category of infeasibility questions. In this article,
we present the Backward-Bounded DSE, a generic, precise,
efficient and robust method for solving infeasibility questions.
We demonstrate the benefit of the method for opaque predicates
and call stack tampering, and give some insight for its usage
for some other protection schemes. Especially, the technique
has successfully been used on state-of-the-art packers as well
as on the government-grade X-Tunnel malware – allowing its
entire deobfuscation. Backward-Bounded DSE does not super-
sede existing DSE approaches, but rather complements them
by addressing infeasibility questions in a scalable and precise
manner. Following this line, we propose sparse disassembly, a
combination of Backward-Bounded DSE and static disassembly
able to enlarge dynamic disassembly in a guaranteed way,
hence getting the best of dynamic and static disassembly. This
work paves the way for robust, efficient and precise disassembly
tools for heavily-obfuscated binaries.
I. INTRODUCTION
Context. Obfuscation [1] is a prevalent practice aiming at
protecting some functionalities or properties of a program. Yet,
while its legitimate goal is intellectual property protection,
obfuscation is widely used for malicious purposes. Therefore,
(binary-level) software deobfuscation is a crucial task in reverse-
engineering, especially for malware analysis.
A first step of deobfuscation is to recover the most accurate
control-flow graph of the program (disassembly), i.e. to recover
all instructions and branches of the program under analysis.
This is already challenging for non-obfuscated codes due to
tricky (but common) low-level constructs [2] like indirect
control flow (computed jumps, jmp eax) or the interleaving
of code and data. But the situation gets largely worst in the
case of obfuscated codes.
Standard disassembly approaches are essentially divided
into static methods and dynamic methods. On one hand, static
(syntactic) disassembly tools such as IDA or Objdump have
? Work partially funded by ANR, grant 12-INSE-0002.
the potential to cover the whole program. Nonetheless, they
are easily fooled by obfuscations such as code overlapping
[3], opaque predicates [4], opaque constants [5], call stack
tampering [6] and self-modification [7]. On the other hand,
dynamic analysis cover only a few executions of the program
and might miss both significant parts of the code and crucial
behaviors. Dynamic Symbolic Execution (DSE) [8], [9] (a.k.a
concolic execution) is a recent and fruitful formal approach to
automatic testing, has recently been proposed has an interesting
approach for disassembly [10], [11], [12], [13], [14], more
robust than static analysis and covering more instructions than
dynamic analysis. Currently, only dynamic analysis and DSE
are robust enough to address heavily obfuscated codes.
Problem. Yet, these dynamic methods only address reachability
issues, namely feasibility questions, i.e. verifiying that certain
events or setting can occur, e.g. that an instruction in the code
is indeed reachable. Contrariwise, many questions encountered
during reversing tasks are infeasibility questions, i.e. checking
that certain events or settings cannot occur. It can be used
either for detecting obfuscation schemes, e.g. detecting that
a branch is dead (i.e. it cannot be taken) or to prove their
absence, e.g. proving that a computed jump cannot lead to an
improper address.
These infeasibility issues are currently a blind spot of
both standard and advanced disassembly methods. Dynamic
analysis and DSE do not answer the question because they only
consider a finite number of paths while infeasibility is about
considering all paths. Also, (standard) syntactic static analysis
is too easily fooled by unknown patterns. Finally, while recent
semantic static analysis approaches [15], [13], [16], [17] can
in principle address infeasibility questions, they are currently
neither scalable nor robust enough.
At first sight infeasibility is a simple mirror of feasibility,
however from an algorithmic point of view they are not the
same problem. Indeed, since solving feasibility questions on
general programs is undecidable, practical approaches have to
be one-sided, favoring either feasibility (i.e. answering “feasible”
or "I don’t know”) or infeasibility (i.e. answering "I don’t know”
or “infeasible”). While there currently exist robust methods for
answering feasibility questions on heavily obfuscated codes,
no such method exist for infeasibility questions.
Goal and challenges. In this article, we are interested in
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solving automatically infeasibility questions occurring during
the reversing of (heavily) obfuscated programs. The intended
approach must be precise (low rates of false positives and false
negatives) and able to scale on realistic codes both in terms
of size (efficient) and protection – including self-modification
(robustness), and generic enough for addressing a large panel
of infeasibility issues. Achieving all these goals at the same
time is particularly challenging.
Our proposal. We present Backward-Bounded Dynamic Sym-
bolic Execution (BB-DSE), the first precise, efficient, robust
and generic method for solving infeasibility questions. To
obtain such a result, we have combined in an original and
fruitful way, several state-of-the-art key features of formal
software verification methods, such as deductive verification
[18], bounded model checking [19] or DSE. Especially, the
technique is goal-oriented for precision, bounded for efficiency
and combines dynamic information and formal reasoning for
robustness.
Contribution. The contribution of this paper are the following:
• First, we highlight the importance of infeasibility issues in
reverse and the urging need for automating the investiga-
tion of such problems. Indeed, while many deobfuscation-
related problems can be encoded as infeasibility questions
(cf. Section V) it remains a blind spot of state-of-the-art
disassembly techniques.
• Second, we propose the new Backward-Bounded DSE
algorithm for solving infeasibility queries arising during
deobfuscation (Section IV). The approach is both precise
(low rates of false positives and false negatives), efficient
and robust (cf. Table I), and it can address in a generic
way a large range of deobfuscation-related questions –
for instance opaque predicates, call stack tampering or
self-modification (cf. Section V). The technique draws
from several separated advances in software verification,
and combines them in an original and fruitful way. We
present the algorithm along with its implementation within
the BINSEC open-source platform 1 [20], [21].
• Third, we perform an extensive experimental evaluation
of the approach, focusing on two standard obfuscation
schemes, namely opaque predicates and call stack tam-
pering. In a set of controlled experiments with ground
truth based on open-source obfuscators (cf. Section
VI), we demonstrate that our method is very precise
and efficient. Then, in a large scale experiment with
standard packers (including self-modification and other
advanced protections), the technique is shown to scale on
realistic obfuscated codes, both in terms of efficiency and
robustness (cf. Section VI).
• Finally, we present two practical applications of Backward-
Bounded DSE. First, we describe an in-depth case-
study of the government-grade malware X-TUNNEL [22]
(cf. Section VIII), where BB-DSE allows to identify
and remove all obfuscations (opaque predicates). We
1http://binsec.gforge.inria.fr/
have been able to automatically extract a de-obfuscated
version of functions – discarding almost 50% of dead
and “spurious” instructions, and providing an insights
into its protection schemes, laying a very good basis for
further in-depth investigations. Second, we propose sparse
disassembly (cf. Section IX), a combination of Backward-
Bounded DSE, dynamic analysis and standard (recursive,
syntactic) static disassembly allowing to enlarge dynamic
disassembly in a precise manner – getting the best of
dynamic and static techniques, together with encouraging
preliminary experiments.
Our implementation and experimental data will be made
available if the paper is accepted for publication.
Discussion. Several remarks must be made about the work
presented in this paper.
• First, while we essentially consider opaque predicates
and call stack tampering, BB-DSE can also be useful in
other obfuscation contexts, such as flattening or virtual-
ization. Also self-modification is inherently handled by
the dynamic aspect of BB-DSE.
• Second, while we present one possible combination for
sparse disassembly, other combinations can be envisioned,
for example by replacing the initial dynamic analysis
by a (more complete) DSE [10] or by considering more
advanced static disassembly techniques [2].
• Finally, some recent works target opaque predicate detec-
tion with standard forward DSE [12]. As already pointed
out, DSE is not tailored to infeasibility queries, while
BB-DSE is – cf. Sections VI and XI.
Impact. Backward-Bounded DSE does not supersede existing
disassembly approaches, it complements them by addressing
infeasibility questions. Altogether, this work paves the way for
robust, precise and efficient disassembly tools for obfuscated
binaries, through the careful combination of static/dynamic and
forward/backward approaches.
TABLE I: Disassembly methods for obfuscated codes
feasibility infeasibility
efficiency robustness
query query
dynamic analysis X/×(†) × X X
DSE X × × X
static analysis X X/×(††) X ×
(syntactic)
static analysis × X × ×
(semantic)
BB-DSE × X(‡) X X
(†): follow only a few traces
(††): very limited reasoning abilities
(‡): can have false positive and false negative, yet very low in practice
II. BACKGROUND
Obfuscation. These transformations [1] aim at hiding the real
program behavior. While approaches such as virtualization or
junk insertion make instructions more complex to understand,
other approaches directly hide the legitimate instructions of the
programs – making the reverser (or the disassembler) missing
essential parts of the code while wasting its time in dead code.
The latter category includes for example code overlapping,
self-modification, opaque predicates and call stack tampering.
We are interested here in this latter category. For the sake
of clarity, this paper mainly focuses on opaque predicates and
call stack tampering.
An opaque predicate always evaluates to the same value,
and this property is ideally difficult to deduce. The
infeasible branch will typically lead the reverser (or
disassembler) to a large and complex portion of
useless junk code. Figure 1 shows the x86 encoding
of the opaque predicate 7y2 − 1 6= x2, as generated
by O-LLVM [23]. This condition is always false for
any values of DS:X, DS:Y, so the conditional jump
jz <addr_trap> is never going to be taken.
A (call) stack tampering, or call/ret violation, consists
in breaking the assumption that a ret instruction
returns to the instruction following the call (return
site), as exemplified in Figure 2. The benefit is
twofold: the reverser might be lured into exploring
useless code starting from the return site, while the
real target of the ret instruction will be hidden from
static analysis.
mov eax, ds:x
mov ecx, ds:y
imul ecx, ecx
imul ecx, 7
sub ecx, 1
imul eax, eax
cmp ecx, eax
jz <addr_trap> //false jump to junk
.... ........ //real code
Fig. 1: opaque predicate: 7y2 − 1 6= x2
<main>: <fun>:
call <fun> [...]
..... // return site push X
..... // junk code ret //jump to X instead
..... // junk code //of return site
Fig. 2: Standard stack tampering
Disassembly. We call legit, an instruction in a binary if
it is executable in practice. Two qualities expected for a
disassembly are (1) soundness: does the algorithm recover only
legit instructions? and (2) completeness: does the algorithm
recover all legit instructions? Standard disassembly approaches
essentially include (static) recursive disassembly, (static) linear
sweep and dynamic disassembly.
Recursive disassembly consists in exploring the executable
file from a given (list of) entry point(s), recursively
following the possible successors of each instructions.
This technique may miss a lot of instructions, typically
due to computed jums (jmp eax) or self-modification.
In addition, the approach is easily fooled into disas-
sembling junk code obfuscated by opaque predicates
or call stack tampering. As such, the approach is
neither safe nor complete.
Linear sweep consists in decoding linearly all possible
instructions in the code sections. The technique aims
at being more complete than recursive traversal, yet it
comes at the price of many additional misinterpreted
code instructions. Meanwhile, the technique can still
miss instructions hidden by code overlapping or self-
modification. Hence the technique is unsafe, and
incomplete on obfuscated codes.
Dynamic disassembly retrieves only legit instructions and
branches observed at runtime on one or several
executions. The technique is safe, but potentially
highly incomplete – yet, it does recover part of
the instructions masked by self-modification, code
overlapping, etc.
For example, while Objdump is solely based on linear
sweep, IDA performs a combination of linear sweep and
recursive disassembly (geared with heuristics).
Dynamic Symbolic Execution. Dynamic Symbolic Execution
(DSE) [9], [8] (a.k.a concolic execution) is a formal technique
for exploring program paths in a systematic way. For each path
pi, the technique computes a symbolic path predicate Φpi as a
set of constraints on the program input leading to follow that
path at runtime. Intuitively, Φpi is the conjunction of all the
branching conditions encountered along pi. This path predicate
is then fed to an automatic solver (typically a SMT solver
[24]). If a solution is found, it corresponds to an input data
exercising the intended path at runtime. Path exploration is
then achieved by iterating on all (user-bounded) program paths,
and paths are discovered lazily thanks to an interleaving of
dynamic execution and symbolic reasoning [25], [26]. Finally,
concretization [25], [26], [27] allows to perform relevant under-
approximations of the path predicate by using the concrete
information available at runtime.
The main advantages of DSE are correctness (no false
negative in theory, a bug reported is a bug found) and robustness
(concretization does allow to handle unsupported features of the
program under analysis without losing correctness). Moreover,
the approach is easy to adapt to binary code, compared to other
formal methods [28], [8], [29], [30]. The very main drawback
of DSE is the so-called path explosion problem: DSE is doomed
to explore only a portion of all possible execution paths. As
a direct consequence, DSE is incomplete in the sense that it
can only prove that a given path (or objective) is feasible (or
coverable), but not that it is infeasible.
DSE is interesting for disassembly and deobfuscation since
it enjoys the advantages of dynamic analysis (especially,
safe disassembly and robustness to self-modification or code
overlapping), while being able to explore a larger set of
behaviors. Yet, while on small examples DSE can achieve
complete disassembly, it often only slightly improves coverage
(w.r.t. pure dynamic analysis) on large and complex programs.
III. MOTIVATION
Let us consider the obfuscated pseudo-code given in Figure 3.
The function <main> contains an opaque predicate in 1© and
a call stack tampering in 2©.
<main>: <fun1>:
if (C) { 1© .....
call <fun1> push <X> 2©
//junk a© ret
}
else {
call <fun2> b©
}
//junk c© <fun2>:
ret //fake end of fun .... d©
<X>: ret
//payload
Fig. 3: Motivating example
Getting the information related to the opaque predicate and
the call stack tampering would allow to:
• 1© to know that <fun1> is always called and reciprocally
that <fun2> is never called. As consequence b© and d©
are dead instructions;
• 2© to know that the ret of <fun1> is tampered and
never return to the caller. As consequence a© and c© are
dead instructions. Such trick would also allow to hide the
real payload located at <X>.
Hence the main motivation is not to be fooled by such
infeasibility-based tricks that slow-down the program reverse-
engineering and its global understanding.
Applications. The main application is to improve a disassembly
algorithm with such information, since static disassembly will
be fooled by such tricks and dynamic disassembly will only
cover a partial portion of the program. Our goal is to design
an efficient method for solving infeasibility questions. This
approach could then passes the original code annotated with
infeasibility highlights to other disassembly tools, which could
take advantage of this information – for example by avoiding
disassembling dead instructions. Such a view is depicted in
Figure 4, and a throughout study of such combination is
discussed in Section IX.
Moreover, such infeasibility related information could also
be used in other contexts, for instance to obtain more accurate
code coverage rates in software testing or to guide vulnerability
analysis toward weak parts of the code.
code
more precise
coverage
code
simplified
code
code +
infeasibility
highlights
bb-DSE
sparse
disassembly
software
testing
...
Fig. 4: motivation schema
IV. BACKWARD-BOUNDED DSE
We present in this section the new Backward-Bounded DSE
technique dedicated to solving infeasibility queries on binary
codes.
Preliminaries. We consider a binary-level program P with
a given initial code address a0. A state s , (a, σ) of the
program is defined by a code address a and a memory state
σ, which is a mapping from registers and memory to actual
values (bitvectors, typically of size 8, 32 or 64). By convention,
s0 represents an initial state, i.e. s0 is of the form (a0, σ). The
transition from one state to another is performed by the post
function that execute the current instruction. An execution pi
is a sequence pi , (s0 · s1 · ... · sn), where sj+1 is obtained by
applying the post function to sj (sj+1 is the successor of sj).
Let us consider a predicate ϕ over memory states. We call
reachability condition a pair c , (a, ϕ), with a a code address.
Such a condition c is feasible if there exists a state s , (a, σ)
and an execution pis , (s0 · s1 · ... · s) such that σ satisfies ϕ,
denoted σ |= ϕ. It is said infeasible otherwise. An feasibility
(resp. infeasibility) question consists precisely in trying to
solve the feasibility (resp. infeasibility) of such a reachability
condition.
These definitions do not take self-modification into account.
They can be extended to such a setting by considering code
addresses plus waves or phases [3].
Principles. We build on and combine 3 key ingredients from
popular software verification methods:
• backward reasoning from deductive verification, for pre-
cise goal-oriented reasoning;
• combination of dynamic analysis and formal methods
(from DSE), for robustness;
• bounded reasoning from bounded model checking, for
scalability and the ability to perform infeasibility proofs.
The initial idea of BB-DSE is to perform a backward
reasoning, similar to the one of DSE but going from successors
to predecessors (instead of the other way). Formally, DSE is
based on the post operation while BB-DSE is based on its
inverse pre. Perfect backward reasoning pre∗ (i.e. fixpoint
iterations of relation pre, collecting all predecessors of a
given state or predicate) can be used to check feasibility and
infeasibility questions. But this relation is not computable.
Hence, we rely on computable bounded reasoning, namely
prek, i.e. collecting all the “predecessors in k steps” (k-
predecessors) of a given state (or predicate). Now symmetry
does not hold anymore: while prek can answer positively to
infeasibility queries (if a predicate has no k-predecessor, it has
no k′-predecessor for any k′ > k and cannot be reached), but
cannot falsify them (because it could happen that a predicate
is infeasible, for a reason beyond the bound k). Moreover, it is
efficient as the computation does not depend on the program
size or trace length, but on the user-chosen bound k.
In practice, checking whether prek = ∅ can be done in a
symbolic way, like it is done in DSE: the set prek is computed
implicitly as a logical formula (typically, a quantifier-free first-
order formula over bitvectors and arrays), which is unsatisfiable
iff the set if empty. This formula is then passed to an automatic
solver, typically a SMT solver [24] such as Z3.
Yet, backward reasoning is still very fragile at binary-level,
since computing pre in a perfect way may be highly complex
because of dynamic jumps or self-modification. The last trick
is to combine this prek reasoning with dynamic traces, so that
the whole approach benefits from the robustness of dynamic
analysis. Actually, the prek is now computed w.r.t. the control-
flow graph induced by a given trace pi – in a dynamic
disassembly manner. We denote this sliced prek by prekpi .
Hence we get robustness, yet since some real parts of prek
may be missing from prekpi, we now lose correctness: we
may have false positive FP (because prekpi will be incomplete
w.r.t prek), additionally to the false negative FN due to
“boundedness” (because of too small k). A picture of the
approach is given in Figure 5.
Algorithm. Considering a reachability condition (a, ϕ), BB-
DSE starts with a dynamic execution pi:
• if pi reaches code address a, then compute prekpi((a, ϕ))
as a formula and solve it
– if it is UNSAT, then the result is INFEASIBLE;
– if it is SAT, then the result is UNKOWN;
– if it is TO (timeout), then the result is TO;
• otherwise the result is UNKOWN.
As a summary, this algorithm enjoys the following good
properties: it is efficient (depends on k, not on the trace or
program length) and as robust as dynamic analysis. On the other
hand, the technique may report both false negative (bound k too
short) and false positive (dynamic CFG recovery not complete
enough). Yet, in practice, our experiments demonstrate that the
approach performs very well, with very low rates of FP and
FN. Experiments are presented in Sections VI, VII and VIII.
By convenience, we will not distinguished anymore between
the predicate ϕ and the reachability condition (a, ϕ) if a is
clear from context.
Implementation. This algorithm is implemented on top of
BINSEC/SE [21], a forward DSE engine inside the open-source
platform BINSEC [20] geared to formal analysis of binary codes.
The platform currently proposes a front-end from x86 (32bits)
pre≤k
paths over 
approximated
paths
lost (in 
computation)
post*
(forward DSE)
Fig. 5: prek schema
to a generic intermediate representation called DBA [31]
(including decoding, disassembling, simplifications). It also
provides several semantic analyses, including the BINSEC/SE
DSE engine [21]. BINSEC/SE features a strongly optimized
path predicate generation as well as highly configurable search
heuristics [21], [13] and C/S policies [27]. The whole platform
amount for more than 40k of OCaml line of codes2.
BINSEC also makes use of two other components. First,
the dynamic instrumentation called PINSEC, based on Pin in
charge to run the program and to record all runtime values along
with self-modification layers. Written in C++ it amounts for
more than 3k lines of code. Second, IDASEC is an IDA plugin
written in Python (∼13k loc) aiming at triggering analyzes and
post-processing results generated by BINSEC.
The BB-DSE algorithm is tightly integrated in the BINSEC/SE
component. Indeed, when solving a predicate feasibility,
BINSEC/SE DSE performs a backward pruning pass aiming
at removing any useless variable or constraint. BB-DSE works
analogously, but also takes into account the distance from
the predicate to solve: any definition beyond the k bound is
removed. In a second phase, the algorithm creates a new input
variable for any variable used but never defined in the sliced
formula. The k bound value is defined by the user and can be
modulated as needed.
V. SOLVING INFEASIBILITY QUESTIONS WITH BB-DSE
We show in this section how several natural problems
encountered during deobfuscation and disassembly can be
thought of as infeasibility questions, and solved with BB-DSE.
A. Opaque Predicates
As already stated in Section II, an opaque predicate (OP)
is a predicate always evaluating to the same value. They have
successfully been used in various domains [32], [1]. Recent
works [12] identify three kinds of opaque predicates:
2http://binsec.gforge.inria.fr/tools
• invariant: always true/false due to the structure of the
predicate itself, regardless of inputs values,
• contextual: opaque due to the predicate and its constraints
on input values,
• dynamic: similar to contextual, but opaqueness comes
from dynamic properties on the execution (e.g. memory).
Approach with BB-DSE. Intuitively, to detect an opaque
predicate the idea is to backtrack all its data dependencies
and gather enough constraints to conclude to the infeasibility
of the predicate. If the predicate is local (invariant), the distance
from the predicate to its input instantiation will be short and the
predicate will be relatively easy to break. Otherwise (contextual,
dynamic) the distance is linear with the trace length, which
does not necessarily scale.
This is a direct application of BB-DSE, where p = (a, ϕ)
is the pair address-predicate for which we want to check for
opacity. We call pi the execution trace under attention (extension
to a set of traces is straightforward). Basically, the detection
algorithm is the following:
• if p is dynamically covered by pi, then returns FEASIBLE;
• otherwise, returns BB-DSE (p), where INFEASIBLE is
interpreted as “opaque”.
The result is guaranteed solely for FEASIBLE, since BB-DSE
has both false positives and false negatives. Yet, experiments
(Sections VI, VII, VIII) show that these error ratios are very
low in practice.
Concerning the choice of bound k, experiments in Section VI
demonstrates that a value between 10 and 20 is a good choice
with invariant opaque predicates. Interestingly, the X-TUNNEL
case study (Section VIII) highlights that such rather small
bound values may be sufficient to detect opaque predicates
with long dependency chains (up to 230 in the study, including
contextual opaque predicates), since we do not always need
to recover all the information in order to conclude on the
infeasibility.
B. Call Stack Tampering
Call stack tampering consists in altering the standard
compilation scheme switching from function to function by
associating a call and a ret and making the ret to return to
the call next instruction. The ret is tampered (a.k.a violated)
if it does not return to the expected return site pushed on the
stack at the call.
New taxonomy. In this work we refine the definition of a stack
tampering in order to characterize it better.
• integrity: does ret return to the same address as pushed
by the call? It characterizes if the tampering takes place
or not. A ret is then either [genuine] (always returns
to the caller) or [violated].
• alignment: is the stack pointer (esp) identical at call
and ret? If so, the stack pointer is denoted [aligned],
otherwise [disaligned].
• multiplicity: in case of violation, is there only one possible
ret target? This case is noted [single], otherwise
[multiple].
Approach with BB-DSE. The goal is to check several properties
of the tampering using BB-DSE. We consider the following
predicates on a ret instruction:
• @[esp{call}] = @[esp{ret}]: Compare the content of the
value pushed at call @[esp{call}] with the one used
to return @[esp{ret}]. If it evaluates to VALID, the
ret cannot be tampered [genuine]. If it evaluates
to UNSAT, a violation necessarily occurs [violated].
Otherwise, cannot characterize integrity.
• esp{call} = esp{ret}: Compare the logical ESP value at
the call and at ret. If it evaluates to VALID, the ret
necessarily returns at the same stack offset [aligned],
if it evaluates to UNSAT the ret is [disaligned].
Otherwise cannot characterize alignment.
• T 6= @[esp{ret}]: Check if the logical ret jump target
@[esp{ret}] can be different from the concrete value from
the trace (T ). If it evaluates to UNSAT the ret cannot
jump elsewhere and is flagged [single]. Otherwise
cannot characterize multiplicity.
The above cases can be checked by BB-DSE (for checking
VALID with some predicate ψ, we just need to query BB-DSE
with predicate ¬ψ). Then, our detection algorithm works as
follow, taking advantage of BB-DSE and dynamic analysis:
• the dynamic analysis can tag a ret as: [violated],
[disaligned], [multiple];
• BB-DSE can tag a ret as: [genuine], [aligned],
[single] ([violated] and [disaligned] are
already handled by dynamic analysis).
As for opaque predicates, dynamic results can be trusted,
while BB-DSE results may be incorrect. Table II summarizes
all the possible situations.
TABLE II: Call stack tampering detection
Runtime Status integrity alignment multiplicity
RT Genuine RT: KO[disaligned]
VALID: [genuine] - VALID: [aligned]
RT Tampered RT: KO[disaligned] RT: (2+)[multiple]
[violated] - VALID: [aligned] - UNSAT: [single]
This call stack tampering analysis uses BB-DSE, but with a
slightly non-standard setting. Indeed, in this case the bound
k will be different for every call/ret pair. The trace is
analysed in a forward manner, keeping a formal stack of call
instructions. Each call encountered is pushed to the formal
stack. Upon ret, the first call on the formal stack is poped
and BB-DSE is performed, where k is the distance between the
call and the ret.
From an implementation point of view, we must take care
of possible corruptions of the formal stack, which may happen
for example in the following situations:
• Call to a non-traced function: because the function is not
traced, its ret is not visible. In our implementation these
calls are not pushed in the formal stack;
• Tail call [2] to non-traced function: tail calls consists in
calling functions through a jump instruction instead of
call to avoid stack tear-down. This is similar to the
previous case, except that care must be taken in order to
detect the tail call.
C. Other deobfuscation-related infeasibility issues
Opaque constant. Similar to opaque predicates, opaque
constants are expressions always evaluating to a single value.
Let us consider the expression e and a value v observed
at runtime for e. Then, the opaqueness of e reduces to the
infeasibility of e 6= v.
Dynamic jump closure. When dealing with dynamic jumps,
switch, etc., we might be interested in knowing if all the
targets have been found. Let us consider a dynamic jump
jump eax for which 3 values v1, v2, v3 have been observed
so far. Checking the jump closure can be done through checking
the infeasibility of eax 6= v1 ∧ eax 6= v2 ∧ eax 6= v3.
Virtual Machine & CFG flattening. Both VM obfuscation
and CFG flattening usually use a custom instruction pointer
aiming at preserving the flow of the program after obfuscation.
In the case of CFG flattening, after execution of a basic block
the virtual instruction pointer will be updated so that the
dispatcher will know where to jump next. As such, we can
check that all observed values for the virtual instruction pointer
have been found for each flattened basic block. Thus, if for
each basic block we know the possible value for the virtual
instruction pointer and have proved it cannot take other values,
we can ultimately get rid of the dispatcher.
A glimpse of conditional self-modification. Self-modification
is a killer technique for blurring static analysis, since the
real code is only revealed at execution time. The method is
commonly found in malware and packers, either in simple
forms (unpack the whole payload at once) or more advanced
ones (unpack on-demand, shifting-decode schemes [33]). The
example in Figure 7 (page 10) taken from ASPack combines
an opaque predicate together with a self-modification trick
turning the predicate to true in order to fool the reverser. Other
examples from existing malwares have been detailed in previous
studies (NetSky.aa [10]).
Dynamic analysis allows to overcome the self-modification
as the new modified code will be executed as such. Yet, BB-
DSE can be used as well, to prove interesting facts about self-
modification schemes. For example, given an instruction known
to perform a self-modification, we can take advantage of BB-
DSE to know whether another kind of modification by the same
instruction is possible or not (conditional self-modification).
Let us consider an instruction mov [addr], eax identified
by dynamic analysis to generate some new code with value
eax = v. Checking whether the self modification is conditional
reduces to the infeasibility of predicate eax 6= v.
As a matter of example, this technique has been used on
the example of Figure 7 to show that no other value than 1
can be written. This self-modification is thus unconditional.
VI. EVALUATION: CONTROLLED EXPERIMENTS
We present a set of controlled experiments with ground truth
values aiming at evaluating the precision of BB-DSE as well
as giving hints on its efficiency and comparing it with DSE.
A. Preliminary: Comparison with Standard DSE
We compare BB-DSE with standard forward DSE, as well
as with (unbounded) backward DSE. We are interested in
comparing their efficiencies and their adequacy to infeasibility
questions – through the distribution of their results, between
SAT, UNSAT and timeout. The experiment is performed on a
trace of 115000 instructions and we check at each conditional
jump if the branch not taken is infeasible (UNSAT) or not
(SAT), which is equal to checking if the branch is dead. For
BB-DSE, we take the algorithm for opaque predicate detection
described in Section V, with bound values k = 100 and k = 20.
We argue in latter experiments (Section VI-B) that k = 20 is
a reasonable bound. We use the forward DSE of BINSEC/SE,
and backward DSE is obtained from BB-DSE with a bound set
to ∞.
Results are presented in Table III. While forward and back-
ward DSE provide similar results, BB-DSE clearly surpasses
them in terms of efficiency, spending less than a second for
every predicate without any timeout (≥ 2000 with DSE). From
a result point of view, BB-DSE with k=16 returns very few
UNSAT answers compared to the other methods (54 vs ≥
7000). Actually, this was expected since DSE takes the whole
path into account, and while dead branches are rare in normal
code, dead paths are very common.
TABLE III: Benchmark DSE versus BB-DSE
bound Cond. branch Total
k #SAT #UNSAT #Timeout time
forward DSE / 575 7749 2460 17h43m
backward DSE ∞ 575 7748 2461 17h48m
BB-DSE 100 3378 7406 0 18m78s
BB-DSE 20 10730 54 0 4m14s
Conclusion. This preliminary experiment gives a clear demon-
stration on the advantages of BB-DSE over DSE on infeasibility
questions. Indeed, besides the dramatic gap in efficiency (which
was of course expected since DSE depends on the whole size
trace), DSE reports far more infeasible branches – which would
lead in practice to too many false positives. These results were
expected, as they are direct consequences of the design choices
behind DSE and BB-DSE. On the opposite, BB-DSE is not
suitable for feasibility questions.
B. Opaque Predicates evaluation
We consider here the BB-DSE-based algorithm for opaque
predicate detection. We want to evaluate its precision, as well
as to get insights on the choice of the bound k.
Protocol and benchmark. We consider two sets of programs:
(1) all 100 coreutils without any obfuscation, as a genuine
reference data set, and (2) 5 simple programs taken from the
Fig. 6: Graph opaque predicate detection ratio
State-of-the-Art in DSE deobfuscation [10] and obfuscated with
O-LLVM [23]. Each of the 5 simple programs was obfuscated
20 times (with different random seeds) in order to balance the
numbers of obfuscated samples and genuine coreutils. We
have added some new opaque predicates in O-LLVM (which
is open-source) in order to maximize diversity (Table IV).
TABLE IV: OP implemented in O-LLVM
Formulas Comment
∀x, y ∈ Z y < 10||2|(x× (x− 1)) (initially present in O-LLVM)
∀x, y ∈ Z 7y2 − 1 6= x2
∀x ∈ Z 2|(x+ x2)
∀x ∈ Z 2|bx2
2
c (2nd bit of square always 0)
∀x ∈ Z 4|(x2 + (x+ 1)2)
∀x ∈ Z 2|(x× (x+ 1))
In total, 200 binary programs were used. For each of them a
dynamic execution trace was generated with a maximum length
of 20.000 instructions. By tracking where opaque predicates
were added in the obfuscated files, we are able a priori
to know if a given predicate is opaque or not, ensuring a
ground truth evaluation. Note that we consider all predicates
in coreutils to be genuine. The 200 samples sums up a total
of 1,091,986 instructions trace length and 11,725 conditional
jumps with 6,170 genuine and 5,556 opaque predicates. Finally,
experiments were carried using different values for the bound
k, and with a 5 second timeout per query.
Results. Among the 11,725 predicates, 987 were fully covered
by the trace and were excluded from these results, keeping
10,739 predicates (and 5,183 genuine predicates). Figure 6 and
Table V show the relation between the number of predicates
detected as opaque (OP) or genuine (OK) as well as false
positive (FP) and false negatives (FN) depending of the bound
value k. The experiment shows a tremendous peak of opaque
detection with k = 10. Alongside, the number of false negative
steadily decreases as the number of false positive grows. An
optimum is reached for k = 16, with no false negative, no
timeout and a small number of false positive (293), representing
6.28% of all predicates marked opaque and only 3.17% of all
predicates. In that case, the detection method achieves 1.46
false positive per sample (very low). Results are still very
precise up to k = 30, and very acceptable for k = 50.
TABLE V: Opaque predicate detection results
k
OP (5556) Genuine (5183)
ok miss ok miss TO FP/Tot FP/OP
(FN) ok (FP) (%) (%)
2 0 5556 5182 1 0 0.01 0.02
4 903 4653 5153 30 0 0.26 3.22
8 4561 995 4987 196 0 1.67 4.12
12 5545 11 4890 293 0 2.50 5.02
16 5556 0 4811 372 0 3.17 6.28
20 5556 0 4715 468 2 3.99 7.77
24 5556 0 4658 525 7 4.48 8.63
32 5552 4 4579 604 25 5.15 9.81
40 5548 8 4523 660 39 5.63 10.63
50 5544 12 4458 725 79 6.18 11.56
. Timeout: 5 sec
. a TO counts as a UNKNOWN result (hence, classify the predicate as genuine)
. 10,739 predicates, 5,556 opaque predicates, 5,183 genuine predicates
A glimpse at efficiency. Taking the same detection algorithm
and queries, we want to evaluate predicate solving time. Each
predicate formula is solved using Z33 with a 5 seconds timeout.
Table VI gives for each value of k the total time taken for
solving and the average time per query. For k = 16 the average
time per query is 0.018s which tends to prove that this technique
scales. Previous works aiming at solving invariant opaque
predicates [12] (based on forward DSE) reports an average of
0.49s per queries (min:0.09, max:0.79). Hence, BB-DSE seems
to provides a very significant speed up.
TABLE VI: Solving time (10,739 queries)
k Total time (s) Avg/query(s)
2 89 0.008
4 96 0.009
8 120 0.011
12 152 0.014
16 197 0.018
20 272 0.025
24 384 0.036
32 699 0.065
40 1145 0.107
50 2025 0.189
Conclusion. BB-DSE is very precise at detecting opaque
predicates, and while a bound is of importance, the technique
still performs very well if the bound is not too far from the
optimal one (k between 10 and 30). Query solving time is also
very low.
C. Call Stack Tampering evaluation
We want to assess the precision of the BB-DSE algorithm for
stack tampering detection (Section VI-C). We consider two sets
of programs: (1) the 5 samples used Section VI-B, obfuscated
with the source-to-source obfuscator Tigress [34]; (2) 5
(randomly selected) coreutils without any obfuscation.
3http://github.com/Z3Prover/z3
Files have been obfuscated with the AntiBranchAnalysis
transformation that replace all conditional branches with calls
and rets. The two schemes used by the obfuscator are:
• push; call; ret; ret (the last ret jumps on pushed value)
• push; ret (idem)
Results. Results are given in Table VII. The 5 obfuscated
samples sums up 218 different ret. Among them 77 are
genuine and 141 violated (including 132 single-target). Our
detection method achieves here a perfect score, with no false
positive nor false negative. On The 5 coreutils, our method
does not yield any false positive and most of the ret are proved
genuine (149/156). The few remaining unproved ret come
from unhandled libc side-effects, making formulas wrongly
UNSAT.
TABLE VII: Stack tampering results
Sample
runtime genuine runtime violation
#ret †
proved align/
#ret †
alig/ proved
genuine disal disal single
simple-if 6 6 6/0 9 0/0 8
bin-search 15 15 15/0 25 0/0 24
bubble-sort 6 6 6/0 15 0/1 13
mat-mult 31 31 31/0 69 0/0 68
huffman 19 19 19/0 23 0/3 19
ls 30 30 30/0 0 0/0 0
dir 35 35 35/0 0 0/0 0
mktemp 21 20 20/0 0 0/0 0
od 21 21 21/0 0 0/0 0
vdir 49 43 43/0 0 0/0 0
†each ret is counted only once
Conclusion. BB-DSE performs very well here, with no false
positive and a perfect score on obfuscated samples. The tech-
nique recovers both genuine ret and single-source tampered
ret. Interestingly, no tampered ret were found on the few
(randomly selected) coreutils, supporting the idea that
such tampering is not meant to occur in legitimate programs.
D. Conclusion
These different controlled experiments demonstrate clearly
that BB-DSE is a very precise approach for solving different
kinds of infeasibility questions. They also demonstrate that
finding a suitable bound k is not a problem in practice. Finally,
the approach seems to be scalable. This last point will be
definitely proved in Sections VII and VIII.
VII. LARGE-SCALE EVALUATION ON PACKERS
To validate the scalability of BB-DSE on representative codes,
in terms of both size and protection, we perform a large
scale experiment on packers with the two detection algorithms
already used in Section VI.
Context. Packers are programs embedding other programs and
decompressing/deciphering them at runtime. Since packers are
used for software protection, most of them contain several
obfuscation schemes (including self-modification). As a matter
of fact, packers are also widely used by malware, and actually
in many cases they are the only line of defense. Hence, packers
are very representative for our study, both in terms of malware
protections and size, as packed programs tend to have huge
execution traces.
Protocol. We want to check if BB-DSE is able to detect opaque
predicates or call stack tampering on packed programs. For
that, a large and representative set of packers was chosen,
ranging from free to commercial tools. Then a stub binary
(hostname) was packed by each packer. Analyses are then
triggered on these packed programs in a black-box manner, that
is to say, without any prior knowledge of the internal working
of the packers – we do not know which obfuscation are used.
For homogeneity, trace length are limited to 10M instructions
and packers reaching this limit were not analysed.
A. Results
Table VIII shows the partial results on 10 packers. The
complete results are given in Table XVII in appendix. First,
BB-DSE is efficient and robust enough to pass on most of
the packed programs, involving traces of several millions of
instructions and advanced protections such as self-modification.
Second, over the 32 packers, 420 opaque predicates and 149
call/stack tampering have been found, and many functions
have also been proved genuine. All the results that have been
manually checked appeared to be true positive (we did not
checked them all because of time constraints).
B. Other Discoveries
Opaque predicates. Results revealed interesting patterns,
for instance ACProtect tends to add opaque predicates by
chaining conditional jumps that are mutually exclusive like:
jl 0x100404c ; jge 0x100404c. In this example the
second jump is necessarily opaque since the first jump
strengthens the path predicate, enforcing the value to be
lower. This example shows that our approach can detect both
invariant and contextual opaque predicates, and should also
detect dynamic opaque predicates since they are similar to
contextual opaque predicates. Many other variants of this
pattern were found: jp/jnp, jo/jno, etc. Similarly, the
well-known opaque predicate pattern xor ecx, ecx; jnz
was detected in ARMADILLO. As a value xor(ed) by itself
always return 0, the jnz is never taken.
The dynamic aspect of BB-DSE allowed to bypass some
tricks that would misled a reverser into flagging a predicate
as opaque. A good example is a predicate found in ASPack
seemingly opaque but that turned not to be opaque due to a
self-modification (Figure. 7). Statically, the predicate is opaque
since BL is necessarily 0 but it turns out that the second opcode
bytes of the MOV BL, 0X0 is being patched to 1 in one branch
in order to take the other branch when looping back later on.
Call/stack tampering. From the call/stack tampering perspec-
tive and according to the taxonomy defined in Section V, many
different kinds of violations were detected. The first two pat-
terns found in ACProtect shown in Figures 8 and 9 are respec-
tively detected as [violated], [single], [aligned]
TABLE VIII: Packer experiment OP & Stack tampering
Packers size tr. len
Opaque Pred. Stack tampering
Unk OP TO OK (a/d/g) KO (a/d/s)
ACProtect v2.0 101K 1.8M 74 159 0 0(0/0/0) 48(45/1/45)
ASPack v2.12 10K 377K 32 24 0 11(7/0/7) 6(1/4/1)
Crypter v1.12 45K 1.1M 263 24 0 125(94/0/94) 78(0/30/32)
Expressor 13K 635K 42 8 0 14(10/0/10) 0(0/0/0)
nPack v1.1.300 11K 138K 41 2 0 21(14/0/14) 1(0/0/0)
PE Lock 21K 2.3M 53 90 0 4(3/0/3) 3(0/1/0)
RLPack 6K 941K 21 2 0 14(8/0/8) 0(0/0/0)
TELock v0.51 12K 406K 0 2 0 3(3/0/3) 1(0/1/0)
Upack v0.39 4K 711K 11 1 0 7(5/0/5) 1(0/0/0)
UPX v2.90 5K 62K 11 1 0 4(2/0/2) 0(0/0/0)
opaque predicates: k = 16 - Unk: query return Unknown - OP: proved as opaque
stack tampering: OK: #ret runtime behavior is genuine - KO: #ret violated at runtime
. a: proved aligned - d: proved disaligned - g: proved genuine - s: proved to have a single target
[....]
10040fe:  mov bl, 0x0
10041c0: cmp bl, 0x0
1004103: jnz 0x1004163
1004105: inc [ebp+0xec]
[...]
ZF = 0 ZF = 1
1004163: jmp 0x100416d
[...]
0x10040ff at 
runtime
0x1
Fig. 7: ASPack opaque predicate decoy
and [violated], [single], [disaligned]. Figures
11, 10 and 12 show three different kinds of violation found in
ASPack. In the first example (cf. Figure 11) the tampering is
detected with labels [violated], [disaligned] since
the stack pointer read the ret address at the wrong offset.
In the second example (cf. Figure 10), the return value
is modified in place. The tampering is detected with the
[violated], [aligned], [single] tags. The last ex-
ample (cf. Figure 12), takes place between the transition of two
self-modification layers and the ret is used for tail-transitioning
to the packer payload (i.e., the original unpacked program). This
violation is detected with [violated], [disaligned],
[single] since the analysis matches a call far upper in
the trace which is disaligned. Note that instruction push
0x10011d7 at address 10043ba is originally a push 0, but
it is patched by instruction at address 10043a9, triggering the
entrance in a new auto-modification layer when executing it.
This pattern reflects a broader phenomenon found in many
packers like nPack, TELock or Upack having a single ret
tampered: these packers perform their tail transition to the
entrypoint of the original (packed) program with push; ret.
Thus, such analysis allows to find precisely that moment
in the execution trace, where the payload is highly likely
decompressed in memory.
address mnemonic comment
1004328 call 0x1004318 //push 0x100432d as return
1004318 add [esp], 9 //tamper the value in place
100431c ret //return to 0x1004n336
Fig. 8: ACProtect violation 1/2
address mnemonic comment
1001000 push 0x1004000
1001005 push 0x100100b
100100a ret jump on the ret below
100100b ret jump on 0x1004000
Fig. 9: ACProtect violation 2/2
address len mnemonic comment
1004a3a 5 call 0x1004c96 //push 0x1004a3f as return site
1004c96 5 call 0x1004c9c //push 0x1004c9b as return site
1004c9c 1 pop esi //pop return address in esi
1004c9d 5 sub esi, 4474311
1004ca3 1 ret //return to 0x1004a3f
Fig. 10: ASPack violation 1/3
address mnemonic comment
1004002 call 0x100400a //push 0x1004007 as return
1004007 .byteinvalid //invalid byte (cannot disassemble)
1004008 [...] //not disassembled
100400a pop ebp //pop return address in ebp
100400b inc ebp //increment ebp
100400c push ebp //push back the value
100400d ret //jump on 0x1004008
Fig. 11: ASPack violation 2/3
address mnemonic layer comment
10043a9 mov [ebp+0x3a8], eax 0 //Patch push value at 10043ba*
10043af popa 0 //restore initial program context
10043b0 jnz 0x10043ba 0 //enter last SM layer (payload)
Enter SMC Layer 1
10043ba push 0x10011d7 1 //push the address of the entrypoint
10043bf ret 0 //use ret to jump on it
10011d7 [...] 1 //start executing payload
*(at runtime eax=10011d7 and ebp+0x3a8=10043bb)
Fig. 12: ASPack violation 3/3
C. Conclusion
By detecting opaque predicates and call/stack tampering
on packers with multi-million trace length, this experiment
clearly demonstrates both the ability of BB-DSE to scale to
realistic obfuscated examples (without any prior-knowledge of
the protection schemes) and its usefulness. This study yields
also a few unexpected and valuable insights on the inner
working on the considered packers, such as some kinds of
protections or the location of the jump to the entrypoint of the
original unpacked program.
VIII. REAL-WORLD MALWARE: X-TUNNEL
A. Context & Goal
Context. As an application of the previous techniques we focus
in this section on the heavily obfuscated X-TUNNEL malware.
X-TUNNEL is a ciphering proxy component allowing the
X-AGENT malware to reach the command and control (CC) if it
cannot reach it directly [22]. It is usually the case for machines
not connected to internet but reachable from an internal network.
These two malwares are being used as part of target attack
campaigns (APT) from the APT28 group also known as Sednit,
Fancy Bear, Sofacy or Pawn Storm. This group, active since
2006, targets geopolitical entities and is supposedly highly
tight to Russian foreign intelligence. Among alleged attacks,
noteworthy targets are NATO [35], EU institutions [36], the
White House [37], the German parliaments [38] and more
recently the American Democrate National Comittee DNC [39]
that affected the running of elections. This group also makes
use of many 0-days [40] in Windows, Flash, Office, Java and
also operate other malwares like rootkits, bootkits, droppers,
Mac 0SX malwares [41] as part of its ecosystem.
Goal. This use-case is based on 3 X-TUNNEL samples4
covering a 5 month period (if timestamps are correct). While
Sample #0 is not obfuscated and can be straightforwardly
analyzed, Samples #1 and #2 are, and they are also much
larger than Sample #0 (cf. Table IX). The main issue raised
here is:
G1: Is there new functionalities in the obfuscated samples?
Answering this question requires first to be able to analyse
the obfuscated binaries. Hence we focus here on a second goal:
4We warmly thank Joan Calvet for providing the samples.
G2: Recover a de-obfuscated version of the obfuscated
samples.
TABLE IX: Samples infos
Sample #0 Sample #1 Sample #2
42DEE3[...] C637E0[...] 99B454[...]
obfuscated No Yes Yes
size 1.1 Mo 2.1 Mo 1.8 Mo
creation date 25/06/2015 02/07/2015 02/11/2015
#functions 3039 3775 3488
#instructions 231907 505008 434143
We show in the latter how BB-DSE can solve goal G2, and
we give hints on what is to be done to solve G1.
Analysis context. Obfuscated samples appeared to contain a
tremendous amount of opaque predicates. As a consequence,
our goal is to detect and remove all opaque predicates in
order to remove the dead-code and meaningless instructions
to hopefully obtain a de-obfuscated CFG. This deobfuscation
step is a prerequisite for later new functionality finding.
The analysis here has to be performed statically:
• as the malware is a network component, it requires to
connect to the CC server, which is not desirable;
• following the same line, many branching conditions are
network-event based, thus unreliable and more hardly
reproducible (and would also require infected clients for
connection to X-TUNNEL);
• X-TUNNEL does not look to use any self-modification
obfuscation or neatly tricks to hamper the disassembly.
Thus the whole disassembled code is available.
The only difference with previous experiments is the need to
test the two branches for each conditional jumps.
B. Analysis
OP detection. The analysis performs a BB-DSE on every
conditional jumps of the program, testing systematically both
branches. Taking advantage of previous experiments, we set
the the bound k to 16. The solver used is Z3 with a 6s timeout.
If both branches are UNSAT, the predicate is considered dead,
as the unsatisfiability is necessarily due to path constraints
indicating that the predicate is not reachable.
Code simplification. We perform three additional computa-
tions in complement to the opaque predicate detection:
• predicate synthesis recovers the high-level predicate of an
opaque predicate by backtracking on its logical operations.
The goal of this analysis is twofold: (1) indexing the
different kind of predicates used and (2) identifying
instruction involved in the computation of an OP denoted
spurious instructions (in order to remove them);
• liveness propagation based on obfuscation-related data
aims at marking instruction by theirs status, namely alive,
dead, spurious;
• reduced CFG extraction extracts the de-obfuscated CFG
based on the liveness analysis.
C. Results
Execution time. Table X reports the execution time of the the
BB-DSE and predicate synthesis. The predicate synthesis takes
a non-negligible amount of time, yet it is still very affordable,
and moreover our implementation is far from optimal.
TABLE X: Execution time
#preds DSE Synthesis Total
Sample #1 34505 57m36 48m33 1h46m
Sample #2 30147 50m59 40m54 1h31m
OP diversity. Each sample presents a very low diversity
of opaque predicates. Indeed, solely 7x2 − 1 6= x2 and
2
x2+1 6= y2 + 3 were found. Table XI sums up the distribution
of the different predicates. The amount of predicates and
their distribution supports the idea that they were inserted
automatically and picked randomly.
TABLE XI: Opaque predicates variety
7y2 − 1 6= x2 2
x2+1
6= y2 + 3
Sample #1 6016 (49.02%) 6257 (50.98%)
Sample #2 4618 (45.37%) 5560 (54.62%)
Detection results. As the diversity of opaque predicates is very
low, we are able to determine, with quite a good precision,
the amount of false negatives and false positives based on the
predicate synthesized. If a predicates matches one of the two
OP and was detected OK, then we considered it false negative
(respectively false positive). Results are given in Table XII and
Figure 13. The detection rate is satisfactory as false negatives
only represent 3% of all predicates. Conversely, 8.4 to 8.6%
of false positive are wrongly tagged opaque.
TABLE XII: Opaque predicates evaluation
#pred
OK OP Likely
OK FN OP FP OK OP
Sample #1 34505 17197 1046 11973 2968 1156 165
(49.8%) (3.0%) (34.7%) (8.6%) (3.4%) (0.4%)
Sample #2 30147 16148 914 9790 2543 606 146
(53.7%) (3.0%) (32.5%) (8.4%) (2.0%) (0.5%)
likely: predicates were both branches were UNSAT
Dependency evaluation. As seen previously, a large k bound
can lead to false positive due to nested opaque predicates while
in the meantime a low bound misses some predicates. Finding
the right balance is still an important issue, but results with
12138 OP detected against 1046 false negative tend to confirm
that such a low bound is a good trade-off. Across the two
samples, the maximum distance between a predicate and its
(a) OP results Sample #1 (b) OP results Sample #2
 FN  OK  Opaque  FP
Fig. 13: Graph of opacity distribution
variable definition where 230 (Sample #1) and 148 (Sample
#2). Still, the average computed on all the OPs yield an average
of 8.7.
Difference with O-LLVM. Interesting differences with OP
found in O-LLVM are to be emphasized. Firstly, there is more
interleaving between the payload and the OPs computation.
Some meaningful instructions are often encountered within
the predicate computation. Secondly, while O-LLVM OPs are
really local to the basic block, there are here some code sharing
between predicates. As a consequence, predicates are not fully
independent from one another. Also, the obfuscator uses local
function variables to store temporary results at the beginning of
the function for later usage in opaque predicates. This leads to
increase the depth of the dependency chain and to complicate
the detection.
Code simplification, Reduced CFG extraction. Table XIII
shows the number of instructions re-classified based on
their status. The dead code represents 1/4 of all program
instructions. Computing the difference with the original non-
obfuscated program shows a very low difference. Therefore,
the simplification pass allowed to retrieve a program which is
roughly the size of the original one. The difference is highly
likely to be due to the false negatives or missed spurious
instructions. Finally, Figure 14 shows a function originally
(a), with the status tags (b), and the result after extraction (c)
using tags (red:dead, orange:spurious, green:alive). Although
the CFG extracted still containing noise, it allows a far better
understanding of the function behavior. A demo video showing
the deobfuscation of a X-TUNNEL function with BINSEC and
IDASEC is available as material for this paper5.
TABLE XIII: Code simplification results
#instr #alive #dead #spurious diff sample #0†
Sample #1 507,206
279,483 121,794 103,731
47,576
(55%) (24%) (20%)
Sample #2 436,598
241,177 113.764 79,202
9,270
(55%) (26%) (18%)
† Sample #0: 231,907 instrs
5https://youtu.be/Z14ab_rzjfA
(a) Original function CFG (b) CFG tagged (c) CFG extracted
Fig. 14: Examples of CFG extraction
D. Conclusion
About the case-study. We have been able to automatically
detect opaque predicates in the two obfuscated samples of
the X-TUNNEL malware, leading a significant (and automatic)
simplification of these codes – removing all spurious and dead
instructions. Moreover, we have gained insights (both strengths
and weaknesses) into the inner working of X-TUNNEL pro-
tections. Hence, we consider that goal G2 has been largely
achieved. In order to answer to the initial question (G1), some
similarity algorithms should now be computed between the
non-obfuscated and simplified samples, in order to detect if
some new functions have been added to the code. Moreover,
our analysis also pinpoints the protected functions (a small
minority), and this information can surely be taken into account.
For now, this second analysis step is left as a future work.
About X-TUNNEL protections. The obfuscation found here
are quite sophisticated compared with existing opaque predi-
cates found in the state-of-the-art. It successfully manages to
spread the data dependency across a function so that some
predicates cannot be solved locally at the basic block level.
Hopefully, this is not a general practice across predicates so
that the BB-DSE works very well in the general case. The
main issue of the obfuscation is the low diversity of opaque
predicates in the way that some pattern matching can come
in relay of symbolic approaches to classify a posteriori false
positives and false negatives.
IX. APPLICATION: SPARSE DISASSEMBLY
A. Principles
As already explained, static and dynamic disassembly
methods tend to have complementary strengths and weak-
nesses, and BB-DSE is the only robust approach targeting
infeasibility questions. Hence, we propose sparse disassembly,
an algorithm based on recursive disasssembly reinforced
with a dynamic trace and complementary information about
obfuscation (computed by BB-DSE) in order to provide a
more precise disassembly of obfuscated codes. The basic
idea is to enlarge and initial dynamic disassembly by a
cheap syntactic disassembly in a guaranteed way, following
information from BB-DSE, hence getting the best of dynamic
and static approaches.
The approach takes advantage of the two analyses presented
in Sections VI-B and VI-C in the following way (cf. Figure15):
• use dynamic values found in the trace to keep disassem-
bling after indirect jump instructions;
• use opaque predicates found by BB-DSE to avoid dis-
assembling dead branches (thus limiting the number of
recovered non legit instructions);
• use stack tampering information found by BB-DSE to
disassemble ret targets in case of violation, as well as
not to disassemble the return site of the call in this
case.
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Fig. 15: Sparse disassembly combination
Implementation. A preliminary version of this algorithm has
been integrated in BINSEC, taking advantage of the existing
recursive disassembly algorithm. The BB-DSE procedure sends
OP and ret information to the modified recursive disassembler,
which takes the information into account.
B. Preliminary Evaluation
We report two sets of experiments, designed to assess the
precision of the approach and its ability to enlarge an initial
dynamic trace. We compare our method mainly to the well-
known disassembly tools IDA and Objdump. IDA relies on
a combination of recursive disassembly, linear sweep and
dedicated heuristics. Objdump performs only liner sweep.
Precision. In the first evaluation, we compare these different
tools on simple programs obfuscated either by O-LLVM
(opaque predicates) or Tigress (stack tampering). In each
experiment, we compare the set of disassembled instructions
with the set of legitimate instructions of the obfuscated program
(i.e. those instructions which can be part of a real execution).
It turns out on these small examples that all methods are able
to find all the legitimate instructions, yet they may nor may
not be lured into dead instructions introduced by obfuscation.
Tables XIV and XV present our results. We report for each
program and each disassembly method the number of recovered
instructions. It turns out that this information is representative
of the quality of the disassembly (the less instruction, the
better), given the considered obfuscations and the fact that
here all methods recover all legitimate instructions (actually,
all results have been checked manually).
TABLE XIV: Sparse disassembly opaque predicates
sample
Obfuscated gain
no
perfect IDA Objdump
BINSEC vs IDA
obf. sparse (sparse)
simple-if 37 185 240 244 185 23,23%
huffman 558 3226 3594 3602 3226 10,26%
mat_mult 249 854 1075 1080 854 20,67%
bin_search 105 833 1110 1115 833 24,95%
bubble_sort 121 1026 1531 1537 1026 32,98%
TABLE XV: Sparse disassembly stack tampering
sample
Obfuscated gain
no
perfect IDA Objdump
BINSEC vs IDA
obf. sparse (sparse)
simple-if 37 83 95 98 83 14.45%
huffman 558 659 678 683 659 2.80%
mat_mult 249 461 524 533 461 12.0%
bin_search 105 207 231 238 207 10.39%
bubble_sort 121 170 182 185 170 6.6%
In both cases, sparse disassembly achieves a perfect score –
recovering all but only legitimate instructions, performing better
than IDA and Objdump. Especially, when opaque predicates
are considered, sparse disassembly recovers up to 32% less
instructions than IDA.
Improvement over dynamic analysis. We now seek to assess
whether sparse disassembly can indeed enlarge a dynamic
analysis in a significant yet guaranteed way, i.e. without adding
dead instructions. We consider 5 larger coreutils programs
obfuscated with O-LLVM. We compare sparse disassembly to
dynamic analysis (starting from the same trace).
Here again, the number of recovered instructions is a good
metric of precision (the bigger, the better), since both methods
report only legitimate instructions on these examples (we
checked that BB-DSE was able to find all inserted opaque
predicates). Results are reported in Table XVI. We also report
the output of IDA and Objdump in order to give an upper-
bound of the number of instructions, yet the two tools recover
many dead instructions.
TABLE XVI: Sparse disassembly coreutils
sample
Obfuscated
Tr.len
Objdump IDA
Dynamic BINSEC
disas. sparse
basename 1,783 20,776 20,507 1,159 7,894
env 3,692 19,714 19,460 477 6,743
head 17,682 32,840 32,406 1,299 19,807
mkdir 1,436 57,238 56,767 1,407 10,428
mv 14,346 115,278 114,067 5,261 81,596
Actually, these experiments demonstrate that sparse disas-
sembly is an effective way to enlarge a dynamic disassembly,
in a both significant and guaranteed manner. Indeed, sparse
disassembly recovers between 6x and 16x more instructions
than dynamic disassembly, yet it still recovers much less
than linear sweep – due to the focused approach of dynamic
disassembly and the guidance of BB-DSE. Hence, sparse
disassembly stays close to the original trace.
Conclusion. The carried experiments showed very good and
accurate results on controlled samples, achieving perfect dis-
assembly. From this stand-point, sparse disassembly performs
better than combination of both recursive and linear like in
IDA, with up to 30% less recovered instructions than IDA.
The coreutils experiments showed that sparse disassembly
is also an effective way to enlarge a dynamic disassembly in a
both significant and guaranteed manner. In the end, this is a
clear demonstration of infeasibility-based information used in
the context of disassembly.
Yet, our sparse disassembly algorithm is still very preliminary.
It is currently limited by the inherent weaknesses of recursive
disassembly (rather than sparse disassembly shortcomings),
for example the handling of computed jumps would require
advanced pattern techniques.
X. DISCUSSION: SECURITY ANALYSIS
From the attacker point of view, two main counter-measures
can be employed to hinder our approach. We present them as
well as some possible mitigation.
The first counter-measure is to artificially spread the compu-
tation of the obfuscation scheme over a long sequence of code,
hoping either to evade the “k” bound of the analysis (false
negatives) or to force a too high value for k (false positives or
timeouts). Nevertheless, it is often not necessary to backtrack
all the dependencies to prove infeasibility. An example is given
in X-TUNNEL were many predicates have a dependency chain
longer than the chosen bound (k=16, chain up to 230) but
this value was most of the time sufficient to gather enough
constraints to prove predicate opacity. Moreover, a very good
mitigation for these “predicates with far dependencies” is to
rely on a more generic notion of the k bound, based for example
on def-use chain length or some formula complexity criterias
rather than a strict number of instructions.
The second counter-measure is to introduce hard-to-solve
predicates (based for example on Mixed-Boolean Arith-
metic [42] or cryptographic hashing functions) in order to
lead to inconclusive solver responses (timeout). As we cannot
directly influence the solving mechanism of SMT solvers,
there is no clear mitigation from the defender perspective.
Nonetheless, solving such hard formula is an active topic
research and some progress can be expected in a middle-term.
Moreover, triggering a timeout is already a valuable information,
since BB-DSE with reasonable k bound usually does not
timeout. The defender can take advantage of it by manually
inspecting the timeout root cause and deduce a hard-to-solve
(in-)feasible pattern, which can now be detected through mere
syntactic matching. Finally, such counter-measures would
greatly complicate the malware design (and its cost!) and
a careless insertion of such complex patterns could lead to
atypical code structures prone to relevant malware signatures.
XI. RELATED WORK
DSE and deobfuscation. Dynamic Symbolic Execution has
been used in multiple situations to address obfuscation,
generally for discovering new paths in the code to analyze.
Recently, Debray at al. [10], [11] used DSE against conditional
and indirect jumps, VM and return-oriented programming on
various packers and malware in order to prune the obfuscation
from the CFG. Mizuhito et al. also addressed exception-based
obfuscation using such techniques [43]. Recent work from
Ming et al. [12] used (forward) DSE to detect different classes
of opaque predicates. Yet, their technique has difficulties to
scale due to the trace length (this is consistent with experiments
in Section VI-A). Indeed, by doing it in a forward manner they
needlessly have to deal with the whole path predicate for each
predicate to check. As consequence they make use of taint to
counterbalance which far from being perfect brings additional
problems (under-tainting/over-tainting).
DSE is designed to prove the reachability of certain parts
of code (such as path, branches or instructions). It is com-
plementary to BB-DSE in that it addresses feasibility queries
rather than infeasibility queries. Moreover, BB-DSE scales very
well, since it does not depend on the trace length but on the
user-defined parameter k. Thus, while backward-bounded DSE
seems to be the most appropriate way to solve infeasibility
problems no researches have used this technique.
Backward reasoning. Backward reasoning is well-known in
infinite-state model checking, for example for Petri Nets [44].
It is less developed in formal software verification, where
forward approaches are prevalent, at the notable exception of
deductive verification based on weakest precondition calculi
[18]. Interestingly, Charreteur et al. have proposed (unbounded)
backward symbolic execution for goal-oriented testing [45].
Forward and backward approaches are well-known to be
complementary, and can often be combined with benefit [46].
Yet, purely backward approaches seem nearly impossible
to implement at binary level, because of the lack of a priori
information on computed jumps. We solve this problem in BB-
DSE by performing backward reasoning along some dynamic
execution paths observed at runtime, yet at the price of (a
low-rate of) false positives.
Disassembly. Standard disassembly techniques have already
been discussed in Section IX. Advanced static techniques
include recursive-like approaches extended with patterns dedi-
cated to difficult constructs [2]. Advanced dynamic techniques
take advantage of DSE in order to discover more parts of
the code [14], [28]. Binary-level semantic program analysis
methods [15], [16], [17], [13], [47] does allow in principle a
guaranteed exhaustive disassembly. Even if some interesting
case-studies have been conducted, these methods still face
big issues in terms of scaling and robustness. Especially, self-
modification is very hard to deal with. The domain is recent,
and only very few work exist in that direction [48], [49]. Several
works attempt to combine static analysis and dynamic analysis
in order to get better disassembly. Especially, CODISASM [3]
take advantage of the dynamic trace to perform syntactic static
disassembly of self-modifying programs.
Again, our method is complementary to all these approaches
which are mainly based on forward reasoning [50].
Obfuscations. Opaque predicates were introduced by Coll-
berg [4] giving a detailed theoretical description and possible
usages [51], [52] like watermarking. In order to detect them
various methods have been proposed [53], notably by abstract
interpretation [49] and in recent work with DSE [12]. Issues
raised by stack tampering and most notably non-returning
functions are discussed by Miller [2]. Lakhotia [6] proposes a
method based on abstract interpretation [6]. None of the above
solutions address the problem in such a scalable and robust
way as BB-DSE does.
XII. CONCLUSION
Many problems arising during the reverse of obfuscated
codes come down to solve infeasibility questions. Yet, this
class of problem is mostly a blind spot of both standard
and advanced disassembly tools. We propose Backward-
Bounded DSE, a precise, efficient, robust and generic method
for solving infeasibility questions related to deobfuscation.
We have demonstrated the benefit of the method for several
realistic classes of obfuscations such as opaque predicate and
call stack tampering, and given insights for other protection
schemes. Backward-Bounded DSE does not supersede existing
disassembly approaches, but rather complements them by ad-
dressing infeasibility questions. Following this line, we showed
how these techniques can be used to address state-sponsored
malware (X-TUNNEL) and how to merge the technique with
standard static disassembly and dynamic analysis, in order to
enlarge a dynamic analysis in a precise and guaranteed way.
This work paves the way for precise, efficient and disassembly
tools for obfuscated binaries.
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APPENDIX
TABLE XVII: Packer experiment: Opaque Predicates & Call stack tampering
Packers
Static Dynamic Obfuscation detection
size self-mod. Opaque Predicates (k16) Stack tampering
prog #tr.len (tr.ok/host) #proc #th #layers OK OP To Covered OK (a/d) Viol (a/d/s)
ACProtect v2.0 101K 1.813.598 (X,×) 1 1 4 74 159 0 9 0 (0/0) 48 (45/1/45)
Armadillo v3.78 460K 150.014 (×,×) 2 11 1 1 20 0 1 2 (2/0) 0 (0/0/0)
Aspack v2.12 10K 377.349 (X,X) 1 1 2 32 24 0 136 11 (7/0) 6 (1/4/1)
BoxedApp v3.2 903K / (×,×)∗ 1 15 - - - - - - -
Crypter v1.12 45K 1.170.108 (X,×) - - 0 263 24 0 136 125 (94/0) 78 (0/30/32)
Enigma v3.1 1,1M 10.000.000 (×,×)† - - 1 - - - - - -
EP Protector v0.3 8,6K 250 (X,X) 1 1 1 10 1 0 2 4 (2/0) 0 (0/0/0)
Expressor 13K 635.356 (X,X) 1 1 1 42 8 0 39 14 (10/0) 0 (0/0/0)
FSG v2.0 3,9K 68.987 (X,X) 1 1 1 11 1 0 14 6 (4/0) 0 (0/0/0)
JD Pack v2.0 53K 42 (×,X) 1 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 (0/0) 0 (0/0/0)
Mew 2,8K 59.320 (X,X) - - 1 11 1 0 18 6 (4/0) 1 (0/0/0)
MoleBox 70K 5.288.567 (X,X)‡ 1 1 2 307 60 0 128 X X
Mystic 50K 4.569.154 (X,X)‡ 1 1 1 X X X X X X
Neolite v2.0 14K 42.335 (X,X) 1 1 1 95 1 0 42 9 (3/0) 0 (0/0/0)
nPack v1.1.300 11K 138.231 (X,X) 1 1 1 41 2 0 34 21 (14/0) 1 (0/0/0)
Obsidium v1364 116K 21 (×,X) - - 0 1 0 0 0 0 (0/0) 0 (0/0/0)
Packman v1.0 5,9K 130.174 (X,X) 1 1 1 12 1 0 21 7 (4/0) 0 (0/0/0)
PE Compact v2.20 7,0K 202 (X,X) 1 1 1 11 1 0 1 4 (2/0) 0 (0/0/0)
PE Lock 21K 2.389.260 (X,X) 1 1 6 53 90 0 42 4 (3/0) 3 (0/1/0)
PE Spin v1.1 26K / (×,×)∗ 1 1 - - - - - - -
Petite v2.2 12K 260.025 (×,×) 1 1 0 60 19 0 45 4 (1/0) 0 (0/0/0)
RLPack 6,4K 941.291 (X,X) 1 1 1 21 2 0 25 14 (8/0) 0 (0/0/0)
Setisoft v2.7.1 378K 4.040.403 (×,×)‡ 1 5 4 X X X X X X
svk 1.43 137K 10.000.000 (×,X)† - - 0 - - - - - -
TELock v0.51 12K 406.580 (×,X) 1 1 5 0 2 0 5 3 (3/0) 1 (0/1/0)
Themida v1.8 1,2M 10.000.000 (×,X)† 1 28 0 - - - - - -
Upack v0.39 4,1K 711.447 (X,X) 1 1 2 11 1 0 30 7 (5/0) 1 (0/0/0)
UPX v2.90 5,5K 62.091 (X,X) 1 1 1 11 1 0 26 4 (2/0) 0 (0/0/0)
VM Protect v1.50 13K / (×,X)∗ 1 1 0 - - - - - -
WinUPack 4,0K 657.473 (X,X) 1 1 2 12 1 0 33 7 (5/0) 1 (0/0/0)
Yoda’s Crypter v1.3 12K 240.900 (×,X) 1 1 3 38 1 0 16 4 (3/0) 9 (0/1/0)
Yoda’s Protector v1.02 18K 17 (×,X) 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 (0/0) 0 (0/0/0)
• size prog: size of the program
• #tr.len: execution trace length
• tr.ok: whether the executed trace was successfully gathered without exception/detection
• host: whether the payload was successfully executed (printing the hostname of the machine)
• #proc: number of process spawned
• #th: number of threads spawned
• #layers: number of self-modification layers recorded
• OK, OP, To, Covered: predicate ok, opaque predicate, timeout, predicate fully covered (both branches)
• (a/d/s): (aligned/disaligned/single)
• ∗ failed to record the trace
• † maximum trace length reached (thus packer not analyzed)
• ‡ analysis failed (due to lack of memory)
